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Note 
 
Venerunt, Viderunt, Vicerunt Venue: How TC 
Heartland and In re Cray Have Conquered 
Patent Venue for Corporate Defendants and How 
Congress Can Balance the Scales of Patent Venue 
Justice 
Peter Estall 
Cray Inc., a supercomputing company, sold $345 million 
worth of supercomputers through a single sales rep who lived in 
the Eastern District of Texas.1 Raytheon, believing the super-
computers infringed its patents, filed an infringement action in 
the Eastern District against Cray.2 Cray moved to transfer 
venue to the Western District of Wisconsin, arguing that, under 
the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (hereinafter 
§ 1400(b)),3 the Eastern District was not a proper venue because 
Cray neither “reside[d]” nor had a “regular and established place 
of business” there.4 The district court denied the motion to trans-
fer, ruling that Cray did have a “regular and established place of 
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the wonderful managing department, especially Mel Pulles, Melanie Johnson, 
Karthik Raman, Seung Sub Kim, and Alec Minea for making sure that this Note 
is substantively and mechanically accurate (any remaining mistakes are, of 
course, mine and mine alone). Thanks to Professor Brad Clary for his guidance 
throughout the process as well. Finally, a heartfelt thank you to my parents, 
John Estall and Shirley Boyd for always keeping me grounded and encouraging 
me when I need it. Copyright © 2019 by Peter Estall. 
 1. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 2. Id. 
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). 
 4. See id. § 1400(b) (providing that venue is proper in districts where the 
defendant either “resides” or has a “regular and established place of business”); 
Cray, 871 F.3d at 1357–58.  
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business” in the Eastern District through its sales representa-
tive.5 Cray, frustrated with the overly permissive venue regime 
established by the district court,6 filed for a writ of mandamus 
with the Federal Circuit, arguing that the district court inter-
preted the scope of § 1400(b) too broadly.7 The reverberations of 
that mandamus proceeding have been heard far beyond the case 
at issue: Where, in the digital age, when companies are doing 
business in a radically different manner from a century ago, do 
companies have their “place of business”? And what role do peo-
ple who work for the company, but are not necessarily employ-
ees, play in establishing such a place of business?8 
The patent venue statute, § 1400(b), has a long and complex 
history.9 For the past thirty years, § 1400(b) permitted a huge 
number of patent suits to accumulate in only a few districts 
around the country, particularly the Eastern District of Texas.10 
A patent defendant could be sued in any district where the court 
had personal jurisdiction over the defendant,11 a standard that 
permitted excessive attempts at forum shopping and led to mas-
sive filings in inconvenient or patent-plaintiff-friendly districts, 
particularly the Eastern District of Texas.12 Filings were high in 
the Eastern District; it had been viewed as an attractive forum 
 
 5. Cray, 871 F.3d at 1358. 
 6. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 7. See Cray, 871 F.3d at 1358. 
 8. The primary example used in this Note is transportation provider Uber. 
Uber is perhaps the quintessential new technology company, hiring drivers as 
contractors, not employees, in hundreds of cities across the globe. One major 
question addressed in this Note is whether those drivers (and their cars) consti-
tute a “regular and established place of business” in their respective cities under 
§ 1400(b). 
 9. See Richard C. Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25 
STAN. L. REV. 551, 551–63 (1973). 
 10. See Kaleigh Rogers, The Small Town Judge Who Sees a Quarter of the 
Nation’s Patent Cases, MOTHERBOARD (May 5, 2016), https://motherboard.vice 
.com/en_us/article/aek3pp/the-small-town-judge-who-sees-a-quarter-of-the 
-nations-patent-cases. Non-practicing entities, also known as patent trolls, “buy 
up patents for the sole purpose of suing other companies for infringement.” Id. 
From a patent troll’s perspective, if a district is an appropriate venue, is known 
to be highly patent-plaintiff-friendly, and quickly resolves disputes, it makes 
sense to file suit in that district to enhance chances of winning the case or forc-
ing the defendant to settle. See id. 
 11. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1584 
(Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 12. See Brian Howard, Patent Litigation Trends in the Three Months After 
T.C. Heartland, LEX MACHINA: LEGAL TRENDS (Oct. 18, 2017), https:// 
lexmachina.com/patent-litigation-trends-in-the-three-months-after-t-c 
-heartland; Rogers, supra note 10. 
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due to plaintiff-friendly local rules and relatively quick disposi-
tions.13 In order to limit this forum-shopping, the Federal Circuit 
in In re Cray Inc.14 and the Supreme Court in TC Heartland LLC 
v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC15 have drastically reduced ac-
ceptable venue locations in infringement actions.16 This removed 
many suits from the Eastern District17 but was also an overcor-
rection; it excessively limited forum choices for patent plaintiffs. 
Because § 1400(b)’s text lacks nuance,18 the courts are incapable, 
as a matter of statutory interpretation, of striking an appropri-
ate balance between limiting forum-shopping and giving patent 
plaintiffs meaningful choice in where to file infringement suits.19 
A new balance must be struck, and a new statute is the best way 
to accomplish that. 
This Note attempts to strike that balance by writing that 
statute. On the one hand, plaintiffs are entitled to meaningful 
choice of forum and minimal inconvenience of being forced to lit-
igate in the defendant’s home forum.20 On the other, defendants 
should have reasonable certainty in where they can be sued for 
infringement and should not be forced to litigate in far-flung fo-
rums.21 Our increasingly technology-based society has made 
finding the balance difficult, and this Note also addresses how 
technology has made striking the balance more complex. Part I 
compares patent venue and general-purpose venue and exam-
ines case law interpreting § 1400(b). Part I also describes post-
TC Heartland judicial interpretations of § 1400(b). Part II dis-
cusses how modern technologies may interact with and compli-
 
 13. Rogers, supra note 10. 
 14. 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The Federal Circuit has exclusive ap-
pellate jurisdiction over patent infringement cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012). 
 15. 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
 16. See id. at 1521; Cray, 871 F.3d at 1360–64. 
 17. See Howard, supra note 12 (showing clear trends indicating a decrease 
in patent infringement suits filed in the Eastern District following TC Heart-
land, as well as an increase in motions to transfer). 
 18. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (“[A] patent infringement [suit] may be 
brought . . . where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed 
acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”). 
 19. For this Note’s approach to striking that balance, see infra Part III. 
 20. See generally Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (dis-
cussing the balance between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ interests in forum anal-
ysis). 
 21. See generally World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 
297 (1980) (holding that defendants have a right to be subject to a court’s per-
sonal jurisdiction only where they “reasonably anticipate” suit). 
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cate the venue analysis, demonstrates the inconsistencies cre-
ated by the post-TC Heartland case law, and outlines and cri-
tiques a recent legislative proposal to amend § 1400(b). Part III 
discusses factors that should be considered in a modern patent 
venue analysis and proposes a model patent venue statute to 
provide fair venue options in an infringement action. 
I.  VENUE, INTERPRETATIONS OF § 1400(B), AND HOW 
MODERN TECHNOLOGY MAY AFFECT PATENT VENUE 
ANALYSIS   
Although the text of the patent venue statute has not 
changed materially since 1897,22 interpretations of it have var-
ied substantially since then.23 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas 
Appliance Co. allowed the uneven distribution of patent suits by 
permitting venue in any district where the court had personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.24 Eventually, the judiciary tried 
to solve this problem25 by narrowing the scope of § 1400(b), but 
it has overcorrected. 
Section A briefly describes the statutory provisions govern-
ing venue generally and in infringement actions. Section B ex-
amines judicial interpretations of the statute and discusses 
§ 1400(b)’s differences from the general venue statute.26 Section 
 
 22. See Wydick, supra note 9, at 558. Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 
29 Stat. 695 (“[I]n suits brought for the [patent] infringement . . . the circuit 
courts . . . shall have jurisdiction, in law or in equity, in the district of which the 
defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district in which the defendant . . . shall 
have committed acts of infringement and have a regular and established place 
of business.” (emphasis added)), with § 1400(b) (“Any civil action for patent in-
fringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, 
or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular 
and established place of business.” (emphasis added)). 
 23. See Wydick, supra note 9, at 558–63 (describing major judicial interpre-
tations of § 1400(b) through 1973). Compare TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods 
Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1521 (2017) (holding that the “residence” 
prong of § 1400(b) applies only to the defendant’s state of incorporation), with 
VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (broadening venue to include any districts in which a court could obtain 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant). 
 24. VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1583; see Rogers, supra note 10. 
 25. See Gene Quinn, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Patent Venue Case 
Filled with Patent Reform Implications, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 14, 2016), http:// 
www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/12/14/supreme-court-patent-venue-case-patent 
-reform-implications/id=75751 (“Ultimately, the question that . . . the Supreme 
Court [will] address is whether the Eastern District . . . is a proper venue for 
patent owners to be choosing.”). 
 26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012). This Note is primarily concerned with cor-
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C describes the post-TC Heartland venue landscape and the case 
law that developed in its wake. 
A. VENUE GENERALLY AND IN INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS 
Venue is a physical, geographical location in the United 
States where a given civil action may be filed.27 The general 
venue statue, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (hereinafter § 1391), governs 
venue in most cases filed in federal court.28 Section 1391 pro-
vides for relatively broad venue options; for example, under 
§ 1391(b)(2), a civil action may be brought in the district where 
the cause of action arose.29 When a suit is brought in a district 
where the governing venue statute does not provide for venue, 
that forum is “improper.”30 However, venue in infringement ac-
tions is not controlled by the general venue statute, § 1391, but 
by a specific patent venue provision, § 1400(b). 
Under § 1400(b), venue is proper in the district where the 
defendant “resides,”31 and any district where the defendant com-
mits “acts of infringement” and has a “regular and established 
place of business.”32 The Supreme Court has settled the scope of 
the “residence” prong,33 and the Federal Circuit has settled the 
“regular and established place of business” prong,34 but that in-
terpretation is producing inconsistent results.35 
B. CONFLICTING JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF § 1400(B) 
The Supreme Court has historically read § 1400(b) nar-
rowly.36 Prior to TC Heartland, the Federal Circuit adopted a 
 
porate defendants, not individual infringers, so unless otherwise noted, “resi-
dence” may be read as “corporate residence.” 
 27. See id. § 1390(a). 
 28. Id. § 1391. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3). 
 31. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 34. See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1361–63 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 35. See infra Part II.C. 
 36. See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 
1514, 1521 (2017) (holding that the “residence” prong of § 1400(b) applies only 
to a corporate defendant’s state of incorporation); Fourco Glass Co. v. Trans-
mirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957) (holding that § 1400(b) is the sole 
statutory provision governing venue in patent infringement suits); Stonite 
Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 563 (1942) (same). 
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broader approach.37 Since § 1400(b) was enacted, each time the 
Court has interpreted it, the Court has considered § 1400(b) to 
be the only provision governing patent venue.38 Before TC Heart-
land, when the Court considered § 1400(b), because a corpora-
tion inhabited or resided only in its state of incorporation for 
venue purposes,39 the “residence” prong of § 1400(b) was narrow 
in scope. The circuit courts which addressed the “regular and es-
tablished place of business” language maintained a similarly re-
strictive interpretation of the language.40 This Section discusses 
several of these judicial interpretations of the patent venue stat-
ute leading up to TC Heartland. 
1. The Federal Circuit’s “Regular and Established Place of 
Business” Case Law 
After VE Holding, decided in 1990 (and pre-TC Heartland), 
because the defendant was deemed to reside anywhere the court 
could obtain personal jurisdiction, the “regular and established 
place of business” prong was rarely litigated.41 Prior to the es-
tablishment of the Federal Circuit in 1982, however, these cases 
were often litigated.42 One illustrative decision of the analysis 
used in interpreting the “regular and established place of busi-
ness” language is In re Cordis Corp.43 In Cordis, decided in 1985, 
the Federal Circuit held that the proper test for determining 
whether a “regular and established place of business” existed in 
the district at issue was whether the corporate defendant did 
 
 37. See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 
1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 38. See, e.g., Stonite, 315 U.S. at 563. 
 39. See TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1518. 
 40. See Steven Pepe & Samuel Brenner, Implications of a Revitalized 28 
U.S.C. § 1400(b): Identifying the “Regular and Established Place of Business” 
for Patent Venue in the Internet Age, 33 TOURO L. REV. 675, 692–99 (2017) (cat-
aloging circuit court interpretations of “regular and established place[s] of busi-
ness”). 
 41. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 42. See Pepe & Brenner, supra note 40, at 692–99 (classifying the four types 
of cases litigated under the “regular and established place of business” prong). 
See generally Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 
Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (establishing 
the Federal Circuit). 
 43. 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Following TC Heartland, and prior to the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017), 
Cordis was considered the best guide to how the Federal Circuit would interpret 
§ 1400(b). See Free-Flow Packaging Int’l, Inc. v. Automated Packaging Sys., 
Inc., No. 17-cv-01803-SK, at 7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2017) (citing Cordis as estab-
lishing the test for a “regular and established place of business”). 
  
2019] PATENT VENUE STATUTE 1531 
 
business in the district with a “permanent and continuous pres-
ence there,”44 not whether the defendant had “a fixed physical 
presence in the sense of a formal office or store.”45 Because 
Cordis met that criterion, the Federal Circuit denied the writ of 
mandamus.46 Prior to TC Heartland, the Cordis “permanent and 
continuous presence” test was the only Federal Circuit guidance 
on the “regular and established place of business” prong of 
§ 1400(b).47 
In 1988, Congress amended § 1391(c)’s definition of corpo-
rate residence.48 This amendment had a drastic impact on the 
scope of patent venue.49 Following the amendment to § 1391(c), 
district courts split on whether Congress intended for the new 
definition of “reside” in § 1391(c) to apply to § 1400(b).50 VE 
Holding resolved that split. The Federal Circuit began by noting 
that, on first reading, §1391(c)’s definition of “reside” overrode § 
1400(b)’s definition.51 However, the Federal Circuit reasoned 
that, based on the historical, narrow construction given to 
§ 1400(b) by the Supreme Court, a narrow construction might 
still be proper, despite facially broad language.52 
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit disregarded this rationale 
and reasoned that, absent any clear legislative intent to the con-
trary, the plain language of § 1391(c)’s definition of “reside” ap-
plied to § 1400(b).53 The Federal Circuit concluded that, because 
§ 1391(c) defined residence as any district in which a corporate 
 
 44. 769 F.2d at 737. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 17–379–LPS, 
2017 WL 3980155, at *14 n.19 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017) (“Cordis is [the] best data 
point this court presently has [on the ‘regular and established place of business’ 
prong].”). 
 48. See Pub. L. No 100-702, § 1013, 102 Stat. 4669 (1988) (“[A] corporation 
shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal 
jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.”). 
 49. See John A. Laco, Note, Venue in Patent Infringement Actions: Johnson 
Gas Fouls the Air, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1107, 1107–08 (1992) (recognizing that 
in VE Holding, the Federal Circuit “dramatically altered longstanding . . . law 
by eliminating the patent venue statute’s independence from the general venue 
statute”). 
 50. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1575 
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (collecting several district court cases that were split on 
whether or not the modifications to § 1391(c) applied to § 1400(b)). 
 51. Id. at 1578. 
 52. Id. This is likely a reference to the Supreme Court decisions in Stonite 
and Fourco taking narrow interpretations of § 1400(b). 
 53. Id. at 1581. 
  
1532 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1523 
 
defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction, the test for venue 
under § 1400(b) was the same.54 For more than twenty-five 
years, patent venue was effectively coextensive with general 
venue and could be obtained anywhere the defendant was “doing 
business”55 and thus subject to the personal jurisdiction of the 
court in the district the suit was filed.56 This permitted the ex-
cessive forum shopping that led to nonsensical distribution of in-
fringement suits. 
2. TC Heartland Settles § 1400(b)’s “Residence” Prong 
After twenty-five years of overly permissive patent venue, 
leading to massive forum shopping, particularly to the Eastern 
District of Texas,57 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in In 
re TC Heartland LLC58 to interpret § 1400(b). TC Heartland, 
however, only addressed the “residence” prong of § 1400(b), not 
the “regular and established place of business” prong.59 The only 
issue in the case was whether Congress had altered § 1400(b)’s 
meaning when § 1391 was amended in 1988.60 The Court recited 
the rule of statutory construction that when Congress wants to 
change the law in a substantial way, it usually gives clear evi-
dence of its intent to do so.61 The Court found no Congressional 
intent to change the scope of § 1400(b) in the text of § 1391(c), 
and reaffirmed its prior jurisprudence of a narrow “residence” 
prong.62 The result of TC Heartland was that, for corporate de-
fendants, “‘reside[nce]’ in § 1400(b) refers only to the State of in-
corporation.”63 The Supreme Court thus maintained its long-
held position that § 1400(b) is the sole statute governing venue 
in infringement actions.64 TC Heartland had an immediate and 
drastic effect: the number of infringement suits pending in the 
Eastern District of Texas dropped sharply after TC Heartland 
 
 54. Id. at 1584. 
 55. Id. at 1583. 
 56. Id. at 1584. 
 57. See Howard, supra note 12; Rogers, supra note 10. 
 58. 821 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. TC Heartland LLC v. 
Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
 59. See TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1517. This was left for the district courts 
and the Federal Circuit to decide. 
 60. Id. at 1520 (considering, essentially, whether VE Holding should be 
overruled). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1521. 
 64. See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 
(1957). 
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was decided;65 prior to TC Heartland, the Eastern District of 
Texas had over twice as many filings as the District of Dela-
ware.66 After TC Heartland, the Eastern District had less than 
half that of Delaware.67  
However, the Federal Circuit followed TC Heartland’s re-
strictive approach too far when it interpreted the “regular and 
established place of business” prong,68 and the pendulum of 
venue in infringement actions has now swung from too favorable 
to patent plaintiffs to far in favor of defendants. While the nar-
row reading of “residence” presents a bright-line, easy to apply 
rule, a similar standard for the “regular and established place of 
business” prong presents a more complex issue.69 
C. THE POST-TC HEARTLAND LANDSCAPE 
Following TC Heartland, the contours of patent venue were 
unclear to both the district courts and parties before them.70 The 
Supreme Court made the scope of the “residence” prong clear: 
“‘[R]eside[nce]’ in § 1400(b) refers only to the State of incorpora-
tion.”71 What exactly the “regular and established place of busi-
ness” prong meant, however, was unclear. 
1. Raytheon’s Four-Factor “Totality of the Circumstances” 
Approach to § 1400(b) 
In Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc.,72 the Eastern District of Texas 
recognized that courts and litigants were struggling with the 
 
 65. See Howard, supra note 12. 
 66. See id. (finding that in the first quarter of 2017, the Eastern District 
had 312 cases filed, and Delaware had 129). 
 67. Id. (finding that in the third quarter, the Eastern District had 139 cases 
filed, and Delaware had 212). 
 68. See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 69. See Benjamin Anger & Boris Zelkind, Where Plaintiffs Are Filing Suit 
Post-TC Heartland, LAW360 (July 7, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 
942115/where-plaintiffs-are-filing-suit-post-tc-heartland; Howard, supra note 
12. For a discussion of the Federal Circuit’s current “regular and established 
place of business” jurisprudence, see infra Part I.C.2. 
 70. See Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 3d 781, 794 (E.D. Tex. 
2017), mandamus granted, order vacated sub nom. Cray, 871 F.3d 1355 (“It is 
evident . . . that there is uncertainty . . . regarding the scope of the phrase ‘reg-
ular and established place of business.’”). 
 71. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 
1521 (2017). 
 72. Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d 781. 
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Cordis “permanent and continuous presence” test73 in a technol-
ogy-infused world74 and created a test to determine what consti-
tuted a “regular and established place of business” in the modern 
era, derived from patent venue case law.75 In Raytheon, the court 
noted that, since Cordis, technology had changed how businesses 
operate, and that patent venue needed to adapt to the current 
realities.76 Raytheon promulgated a four-factor, “totality of the 
circumstances” test for determining whether a particular de-
fendant has a “regular and established place of business.”77 The 
four factors the court considered were: (1) the defendant’s phys-
ical presence in the district; (2) the defendant’s representations 
that it is present in the district; (3) the benefits the defendant 
receives from its presence in the district; and (4) the defendant’s 
targeted interactions with the district.78 Each factor is explored 
in turn below. 
The first factor promulgated by the Raytheon court was the 
“extent to which a defendant has a physical presence in the dis-
trict, including . . . property, inventory, infrastructure, or peo-
ple.”79 The court noted that while a physical place of business, 
such as a “retail store, warehouse,” or similar facility weighed in 
favor of finding a regular and established place of business, the 
“lack of a physical building in the district is not dispositive.”80 
However, it was nonetheless “persuasive.”81 Raytheon noted that 
a requirement of a fixed physical location was “at odds with the 
practicalities and necessities of the business community.”82 The 
court also noted that other types of physical presence in the dis-
trict might support a finding that the defendant had a regular 
and established place of business in the district, including prod-
uct inventory, demonstration equipment, property of the defend-
 
 73. In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 74. See Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 794. 
 75. Id. at 794–99. 
 76. See id. at 796. 
 77. Id. at 796–99. Raytheon’s test was soundly rejected on appeal. See In re 
Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017). However, it remains illustrative 
of factors considered in venue analysis today. 
 78. Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 796–99. 
 79. Id. at 796. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 797. 
 82. Id. (quoting Shelter–Lite, Inc. v. Reeves Bros., 356 F. Supp. 189, 195 
(N.D. Ohio 1973)). 
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ant, and equipment or infrastructure owned or leased by the de-
fendant.83 
The second factor considered was the “extent to which a de-
fendant represents, internally or externally, that it has a pres-
ence in the district.”84 The court accepted the reasoning that 
where a defendant had, publicly, through advertisements and 
the like, accepted a sales representative’s place of business as its 
own, the defendant was then estopped from denying that it had 
no place of business in the district.85 In the Raytheon court’s 
opinion, if a defendant represented it was present in the district, 
that representation weighed in favor of finding that the defend-
ant had a regular and established place of business in the dis-
trict.86 
The third factor analyzed the benefits the defendant re-
ceived from its presence in the district, namely its revenue.87 A 
later case in the Eastern District clarified that this factor was 
not simply that the sale of products in the district, without more, 
gave the defendant “a regular and established place of business” 
in the district.88 Rather, when the defendant receives substan-
tial revenue from activities in the district, it suggests that the 
defendant’s place of business in the district is “regular and es-
tablished.”89 The court also made it clear that the benefits gained 
must be derived from the defendant’s presence in the district, 
not simply the state as a whole (if the state has multiple dis-
tricts), and that there must be “specific probative details . . . re-
garding benefits” the defendant receives to support a finding of 
proper venue.90 
Finally, Raytheon looked to how the defendant targets its 
interactions in the district towards customers for business pur-
poses.91 These purposes included customer support, contractual 
 
 83. Id. (citing In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Hem-
street v. Caere Corp., No. 90 C 377, 1990 WL 77920, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 
1990)). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (quoting Chadeloid Chem. Co. v. Chi. Wood Finishing Co., 180 F. 
770, 771 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910) (Hand, J.)). 
 86. Id. at 798. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Kranos IP Corp. v. Riddell, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-443-JRG, 2017 WL 
3704762, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2017). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 798. 
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relationships, and targeted marketing efforts.92 The court was 
careful to indicate that nationwide marketing efforts that in-
cluded the district were insufficient, under this factor, to weigh 
in favor of a finding of a regular and established place of busi-
ness; the defendant must “specifically target[] the distinct com-
munities within a particular district.”93 Finally, activities like 
goodwill efforts or brand strengthening projects, which might or 
might not produce accompanying revenue, could also weigh in 
favor of finding proper venue, as well as “business development” 
expenditures and other “localized customer interactions.”94 
The Raytheon court emphasized that none of the four factors 
alone was dispositive, and that each case is highly fact-specific 
and should be decided based on the totality of the circum-
stances.95 In essence, though the court did not actually apply the 
test,96 Raytheon was intended to provide other district courts 
with a lodestar to navigate the confusing waters of the “regular 
and established place of business” test. While Raytheon’s test 
was dicta, it was quite influential; several district courts noted 
the test in determining motions to transfer under § 1400(b),97 as 
did practitioners.98 However, the test’s influence was short-lived 
as the Federal Circuit soon reversed Raytheon, holding that a 
totality of the circumstances approach was incompatible with 
the text of § 1400(b). 
2. The Federal Circuit Weighs In on the “Regular and 
Established Place of Business” Prong 
After the district court’s denial of its motion to transfer in 
Raytheon, Cray. Inc. sought and received a writ of mandamus 
from the Federal Circuit.99 The Federal Circuit, in addressing 
the petition, read § 1400(b) to require that defendants meet three 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Kranos, 2017 WL 3704762, at *7. 
 94. Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 799. 
 95. Id. 
 96. The court believed that Cordis was sufficient to support the result and 
that it was unfair to apply the factors where the parties were unaware of them. 
See id. at 799 n.13. 
 97. See, e.g., Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Cook Grp. Inc., 269 F. Supp. 3d 229, 244 (D. 
Del. 2017); JPW Indus., Inc. v. Olympia Tools Int’l, Inc., No. 16–cv–3153–JPM–
bdh, 2017 WL 3263215, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. July 19, 2017). 
 98. See, e.g., Shannon Bjorklund & Payton George, Recent Supreme Court 
Case Triggers Spike in Patent Lawsuits, 11 MINN. CHAPTER FED. B. ASS’N: B. 
TALK, Sept. 11, 2017, at 7. 
 99. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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elements for venue to be proper: (1) a physical place in the dis-
trict; (2) that is regular and established; and (3) that is the place 
of the defendant.100 The Federal Circuit emphasized that in de-
termining “whether a defendant has a regular and established 
place of business in a district,” there is “no precise rule,” and that 
“each case depends on its own facts.”101 According to the Federal 
Circuit, the three “requirements” are used to “inform whether 
there exists the necessary elements [for venue], but do not sup-
plant the statutory language.”102 
First, the Federal Circuit held that a physical place in the 
district was required and that Raytheon erred in holding that 
such a place was not required.103 The court reasoned that such 
an interpretation of § 1400(b) read the statute too broadly as it 
“requires a … ‘building or part of a building set apart for any 
purpose’ or ‘quarters of any kind’ from which business is con-
ducted.”104 Per the Federal Circuit, “place of business” in 
§ 1400(b) does not include virtual spaces or nonphysical commu-
nications.105 Because Raytheon’s approach would permit venue 
to arise based on a virtual, nonphysical presence in the district, 
it was improper.106 The court was careful to clarify that a “place” 
did not have to be a “formal office or store,”107 but stated that 
§ 1400(b) did require a “physical, geographical location” where 
the defendant conducts business.”108 The Federal Circuit cited 
Cordis for examples, including a defendant using its employees’ 
homes for the purpose of storing “‘literature, documents and 
products’” or engaging a secretarial service “physically located in 
the district to perform certain tasks.”109 
The Federal Circuit then turned to interpreting “regular 
and established.”110 Beginning with “regular,” the court stated 
that “sporadic activity cannot create venue,” and that a business 
 
 100. Id. at 1360. 
 101. Id. at 1362. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (quoting Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 3d 781, 797 (E.D. 
Tex. 2017)). 
 104. Id. (quoting WILLIAM DWIGHT WHITNEY, THE CENTURY DICTIONARY 
732 (Benjamin E. Smith ed., 1911)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. (quoting In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 110. Id. 
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activity could be regular if it is conducted in a methodical, uni-
form, or steady manner.111 While no single act of business could 
possibly be “regular,” a series of single acts could be.112 “Estab-
lished” was next; according to the Federal Circuit, because the 
root of “established” is “stable,” the place of business must be 
permanent, settled, or fixed, not ephemeral.113 Based on this 
analysis, while businesses may move their locations, the location 
must be stable and established for some meaningful period of 
time.114 On the other hand, if an employer transacts business 
from an employee’s house, and the employee can move from the 
district at their leisure without the company needing to approve, 
it would be less likely that the place of business is “regular and 
established.”115 
Third, the court addressed the requirement that the regular 
and established place of business in the district be that of the 
defendant.116 Under the Federal Circuit’s reading, § 1400(b) re-
quires that the place of business be that “of the defendant, not 
solely the place of the defendant’s employee.”117 The defendant 
is required to personally “establish or ratify the place of busi-
ness;” the employee alone cannot.118 A key factor in determining 
whether the place of business is of the business is whether the 
business owns, leases, or “exercises other attributes of posses-
sion or control” over the real estate.119 In its analysis, the Fed-
eral Circuit noted that where a small business is operated from 
a home, that home may make venue appropriate in the district 
in which it is located.120 Relevant considerations for an em-
ployee’s home giving rise to venue might include whether a de-
fendant “conditioned employment on an employee’s continued 
residence in the district or the storing of materials at a place in 
the district so that they can be distributed or sold from that 
place,” as well as marketing or advertisements, but only to the 
extent they indicate that the defendant itself holds out a place 
for its business in the district.121 
 
 111. Id. (citing WHITNEY, supra note 104, at 5050). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1363 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891)). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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Agreeing with Raytheon, the Federal Circuit reasoned that 
the defendant’s representations of a place of business in the dis-
trict were relevant to the venue inquiry, and stated that in de-
termining whether the place of business was of the defendant, 
courts could consider such representations as listing a place of 
business on a website or telephone directory or has its name on 
a building.122 The court cautioned, however, that the fact that a 
defendant has advertised itself as having a place of business in 
the district, or even has an office there, is not alone sufficient; 
the defendant “must actually engage in business from that loca-
tion.”123 
One last factor was “the nature and activity of the alleged 
place of business of the defendant in the district in comparison 
with that of other places of business of the defendant in other 
venues,” as such a comparison “might reveal that the alleged 
place of business is not really a place of business at all.”124 The 
Federal Circuit indicated that the purpose of this factor was not 
to “scrutinize the ‘nature and activity’ of the alleged place of busi-
ness” to judge the relative value of business conducted, but to 
show that a defendant might have a business model which relies 
on the use of home offices or similar, indicating that venue might 
be proper in such districts.125 The last word on the subject was 
that “in the final analysis, the court must identify a physical 
place, of business, of the defendant.”126 
These cases illustrate the necessity of a totality of the cir-
cumstances approach to patent venue analysis, particularly 
when a company does not operate traditional brick-and-mortar 
stores. It is easy to say that a brick and mortar store is a “regular 
and established place of business.” But what about Uber’s cars—
Are they “regular and established places of business”? Bright 
line rules in this sphere work well for companies that have stores 
across the country: Apple, for example.127 But what if the com-
pany provides cloud-based services and has no “regular and es-
tablished place of business”? As adaptability and flexibility are 
the name of the game in the internet age, so too must § 1400(b) 
be able to adapt and flex with technological change. 
 
 122. Id. at 1363–64. 
 123. Id. at 1364. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 1364 n*. 
 126. Id. 
 127. It is clear that any Apple store would meet the Cray test for a regular 
and established place of business. 
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II.  INCONSISTENCIES IN APPLYING CRAY AS A RESULT 
OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATE THE NEED 
FOR AN AMENDED § 1400(B)   
The increasing effects of technology on our society have com-
plicated many aspects of the law.128 These effects have been par-
ticularly acute in patent law. A legal field focused on technolog-
ical innovation is likely to be more affected by changing 
technology than other fields.129 This Part discusses how modern 
technologies have given rise to patent trolls, and how their con-
sistent forum shopping, as well as businesses’ use of computer-
ized technology (and accompanying business practices) have 
complicated patent venue analysis. 
While Cray did not explicitly require that a “‘place’ . . . be a 
‘fixed physical presence in the sense of a formal office or 
store,’”130 that has effectively been the result.131 That, inordinate 
confusion, and inconsistent results. This Part demonstrates why 
the Cray approach is unworkable today. Section A provides back-
ground on patent trolls, largely responsible for the lopsided dis-
tribution of patent suits in the nation. Section B describes how 
new technologies and business practices have complicated the 
venue analysis. Section C considers the difficulties in applying 
the technological changes discussed in Section B to the current 
judicial interpretations of § 1400(b) and demonstrates that, to 
cure the inconsistencies in patent venue, § 1400(b) must be 
amended. Section D describes a current legislative proposal to 
amend § 1400(b), and Section E criticizes that proposal as inad-
equate. 
A. PATENT TROLLS HAVE LED TO INCREASING RESTRICTIONS ON 
PATENT VENUES 
One reason so many infringement suits were filed in the 
Eastern District of Texas is its perceived patent-plaintiff-friend-
liness—a magnet for patent trolls.132 A patent troll is someone 
 
 128. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (recognizing 
that cell phones have introduced substantial difficulties in applying Fourth 
Amendment doctrines). 
 129. Cf. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 134 S. Ct. 
2347, 2357–59 (2014) (applying the law of patentable subject matter to com-
puter technology). 
 130. Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362 (quoting In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 737 
(Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 131. See infra Part II.C. 
 132. See Rogers, supra note 10 (noting several cases in the Eastern District 
involving patent trolls and how patent trolls “overwhelmingly choose to [sue] in 
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who holds or buys patents for the purpose of suing other compa-
nies for infringing those patents, “asserting” the patent; the troll 
does not “practice” the patent.133 Patent trolls are generally 
viewed as burdens on society, rather than providing anything 
useful to the community.134 Patent trolls have largely operated 
in the field of computer and software technology patents, fields 
which are particularly susceptible to abuse due to extremely 
broad and vague patent language.135 For instance, a patent for 
“controlling [a] controllable application” on a computer136 led its 
inventor to sue a veritable “who’s who” of Internet and technol-
ogy companies, claiming over a billion dollars in damages.137 
Software patents are particular goldmines to patent trolls, 
as claims in software patents are often “overly broad, un-
clear . . . or both.”138 With unclear or overbroad patents, there is 
 
the Eastern District of Texas”); see also Joe Nocera, The Town That Trolls Built, 
BLOOMBERG VIEW (May 25, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/ 
2017-05-25/the-texas-town-that-patent-trolls-built-j34rlmjc (“[TC Heartland] is 
also bad news for the [patent] trolls’ long-time venue of choice . . . .”). 
 133. Rogers, supra note 10. 
 134. See Paula Natasha Chavez, The Original Patent Troll, YOUTUBE (Jan. 
28, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lOGoZFzHkhs (conceptualizing a 
patent troll as a green man living under a bridge, jumping out at people desiring 
to cross the bridge, and carrying a sign that says “Pay here to cross”). But see 
Bryan L. Frye, IP as Metaphor, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 735, 747–48 (2015) (arguing 
that patent trolls may actually improve the efficiency of the IP market and 
should not be discriminated against in the patent system). 
 135. See Daniel Nazer, EFF to Court: Don’t Let Trolls Get Away with Assert-
ing Stupid Software Patents, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 9, 2018), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/01/eff-court-dont-let-trolls-get-away 
-asserting-stupid-software-patents (arguing that “the most abusive patent 
trolling tends to come from trolls that own abstract software patents”); see also 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Found. in Support of Plaintiff-Ap-
pellee and Affirmance, Gust, Inc. v. Alphacap Ventures, LLC, No. 2017-2414, 
2018 WL 4653696 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 28, 2018) (No. 2017-2411), 2017 WL 8219098. 
 136. U.S. Patent No. 5,838,906, at [17] (filed Oct. 17, 1994) (issued Nov. 17, 
1998). 
 137. Joe Mullin, The Web’s Longest Nightmare Ends: Eolas’ Patents Are 
Dead on Appeal, ARSTECHNICA (July 22, 2013), https://arstechnica.com/tech 
-policy/2013/07/the-webs-longest-nightmare-ends-eolas-patents-are-dead-on 
-appeal (listing lawsuits against Apple, Google, Amazon, Disney, and others). 
 138. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: AS-
SESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD 
HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 28 (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/ 
657103.pdf; see James Bessen, The Patent Troll Crisis Is Really a Software  
Patent Crisis, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Sept. 3, 2013), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/09/03/the-patent-troll-crisis-is 
-really-a-software-patent-crisis (describing one patent troll threatening to sue 
“hundreds of smartphone app developers” over a patent that claims “[m]ethods 
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risk that the patent claims more than the inventor has actually 
invented,139 and thus may chill legitimate business conduct.140 
When software patents were relatively new, the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office’s standards for granting software patents 
were relatively lax, and the Office granted large numbers of 
vague and overbroad software patents, now of arguable valid-
ity.141 As more software patents were granted, the number of 
trolls buying up those patents and attempting to assert them 
against potential infringers also increased.142 
One reason that patent trolls have been such a nuisance, 
apart from their assertion of vague patents that could potentially 
cover many legitimate practices, is the cost of patent litigation. 
It is extraordinarily expensive to litigate an infringement action: 
approximately $1.6 million through discovery, and nearly $3 mil-
lion through disposition of the case, including trial and appeal.143 
These costs increase when litigating in inconvenient or out-of-
the-way forums, like the Eastern District of Texas, the patent 
trolls’ favorite hunting ground.144 Rather than spend so much 
money defending a nuisance infringement action from a troll, 
many defendants will simply settle the case;145 the cost of litiga-
tion is not worth it. Through their actions, patent trolls have im-
posed a substantial cost on the American economy, estimated at 
 
and systems for gathering information from units of a commodity across a net-
work”); Nazer, supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 139. Patent applicants are required to disclose sufficient information to en-
able others to make and use the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). These 
are the “written description” and “enablement” requirements for patenting. 
 140. Rack Blogger, New Report Shows Chilling Effect Patent Trolls Have on 
Startups, VCs, RACKSPACE (Sept. 10, 2013), https://blog.rackspace.com/new 
-report-shows-chilling-effect-patent-trolls-have-on-startups-vcs. 
 141. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 134 S. Ct. 
2347, 2357 (2014) (holding that “generic computer implementation” is not pa-
tentable). For an example of a case where a patent was invalidated under Alice, 
see Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond Inc., 123 F. Supp. 3d 557, 
562 (D. Del. 2015) (holding “a method and system for processing payments for 
remotely purchased goods” invalid). 
 142. See Bessen, supra note 138. 
 143. Chris Neumeyer, Managing Costs of Patent Litigation, IPWATCHDOG 
(Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/02/05/managing-costs-of 
-patent-litigation/id=34808. 
 144. See Nocera, supra note 132. 
 145. Jason Rantanen, Allison, Lemley & Schwartz on Patent Litigation, PA-
TENTLYO (Oct. 14, 2014), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/10/allison-schwartz 
-litigation.html (out of approximately 5,000 patent cases filed in 2008 and 2009, 
only 290 were tried, and fewer than ten percent received any decision on the 
merits). 
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$29 billion in 2011.146 Given these significant “troll tolls,”147 and 
the inability of Congress to pass comprehensive patent reform,148 
it is perhaps unsurprising that the judiciary attempted to re-
strain patent trolls by limiting the ability to file suit in potential 
nuisance districts.149 Under a more restrictive venue standard, 
the Eastern District of Texas is a suitable venue for fewer suits, 
resulting in fewer nuisance filings in a plaintiff-friendly “judicial 
hellhole,”150 or at least suits that are easier to dismiss for im-
proper venue. As such, although the question of whether an in-
fringement plaintiff is a patent troll or not does not directly in-
fluence the venue analysis, patent trolls, their forum-
shopping,151 and the resulting accumulation of suits in the East-
ern District have had a substantial impact on the recent re-
strictions on patent venue. 
B. TECHNOLOGY COMPLICATES THE VENUE ANALYSIS UNDER 
THE REGULAR AND ESTABLISHED PLACE OF BUSINESS PRONG OF 
§ 1400(B) 
Following TC Heartland, to obtain venue in a district where 
the defendant is not incorporated, patent plaintiffs must rely on 
the “regular and established place of business” prong of 
§ 1400(b).152 Because modern technology does not affect a de-
fendant’s state of incorporation, it is unlikely to affect venue 
analysis under the “residence” prong. The effects of modern tech-
nology on the “regular and established place of business” prong, 
 
 146. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Dis-
putes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 408 (2014) (analyzing the “legal costs, settle-
ment costs, and other costs for resolved lawsuits” of patent troll suits); see Brian 
Howard, 2016 Fourth Quarter Litigation Update, LEX MACHINA: LEGAL TRENDS 
(Jan. 12, 2017), https://lexmachina.com/q4-litigation-update (compiling data on 
the number of infringement suits filed on a year-by-year and quarterly basis). 
 147. See It’s Always Sunny in Philadelphia: The Nightman Cometh (FX tel-
evision broadcast Nov. 20, 2008) (discussing reasons to pay a troll toll). 
 148. Lionel M. Lavenue et al., A Sign of Targeted Patent Reform in Con-
gress?, LAW360 (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/906010 (docu-
menting congressional attempts and failures to pass patent reform). 
 149. See supra Parts I.B.2, I.C.2. 
 150. See Eastern District of Texas, JUD. HELLHOLES, http://www 
.judicialhellholes.org/2011-12/eastern-district-of-texas (last visited Nov. 17, 
2018). 
 151. See Pepe & Brenner, supra note 40, at 675–76. 
 152. See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 
1514, 1521 (2017) (“residence” in § 1400(b) applies only to the state of incorpo-
ration). 
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however, may be monumental, and have already begun to pro-
duce inconsistent venue determinations.153 The “regular and es-
tablished place of business” provision was, during the period be-
tween VE Holding and TC Heartland, rarely litigated.154 
Because § 1400(b) remains textually sparse, courts are forced to 
confront the unclear applications of “regular and established” 
and “place of business” to the internet age.155 The “regular and 
established place of business” prong was often litigated prior to 
VE Holding, developing a substantial body of case law,156 but 
with the advent of modern technology, analogies between past 
and present practices may be difficult to draw. In particular, 
many business practices have changed radically due to technol-
ogy, many of which involve technological facilitation of interac-
tions between companies and their customers. There is one par-
ticular business model in which the issues raised by modern 
technology in the area of patent venue are particularly salient: 
the Uber Model.157 
The Uber Model is a symptom of the longstanding and un-
ceasing effort to cut costs by the relatively new practice of hiring 
contractors, rather than employees,158 but it is facilitated by the 
ubiquity of smartphones in modern society.159 The smartphone 
 
 153. This Note assumes that in cases involving the “regular and established 
place of business” prong, § 1400(b)’s requirement that “acts of infringement” oc-
cur in the district will be satisfied. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). The issue 
may be more complex in reality. 
 154. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 17-379-LPS, 
2017 WL 3980155, at *14 n.19 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017) (“Cordis is [the] best data 
point this court presently has [on the ‘regular and established place of business’ 
prong.]”). 
 155. The Federal Circuit has already addressed the meaning of this second 
portion of § 1400(b) in light of TC Heartland and interpreted it very narrowly. 
See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). For this Note’s discussion of 
Cray, see supra Part I.C.2. This narrow interpretation still leads to confusion, 
however. See infra Part II.C. 
 156. See Pepe & Brenner, supra note 40, at 692–99 (describing recurring fact 
patterns). 
 157. See id. at 703–04. For other business practices that may present similar 
issues, see id. at 704–05. 
 158. Cf. William W. Hurst, Are Uber Drivers Employees or Independent Con-
tractors?, BEST LAW. (June 15, 2017), https://www.bestlawyers.com/article/uber 
-drivers-employees-or-not/1415 (an Uber driver earns approximately sixty per-
cent of federal minimum wage and is thus cheaper than an actual employee). 
See generally Joshua Greenberg, “Uber” Uncertainty: Why Courts Are Ill-
Equipped to Determine Compensability in a Gig Economy, DE NOVO (Oct. 25, 
2017), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/2017/10/uber-uncertainty (discuss-
ing the employee versus contractor dichotomy). 
 159. The model is also potentially highly susceptible to software patent 
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is integral at every step of the user/driver interaction: the user 
calls and pays for the Uber on his smartphone; the driver, using 
her personal car, not Uber’s, uses her phone to accept the call, 
and to navigate to the pickup and drop-off points. In the Uber 
Model, the corporate defendant is generally incorporated in one 
district and physically located in another,160 but has employees 
or contractors who act or transact business under color of the 
corporation’s name across the nation.161 In cities like New York, 
Los Angeles, or Chicago, Uber drivers provide hundreds of thou-
sands of trips per day, using their own cars, while Uber itself 
collects substantial revenue at much lower cost than it would if 
it owned the cars directly.162 
The fact that “Uber, the world’s largest taxi company, owns 
no vehicles”163 illustrates the point. Uber permits hundreds, 
even thousands of drivers in cities and states across the country 
to benefit from using its name. Uber earns a massive amount of 
money from this practice,164 but it’s unclear whether the drivers 
and their vehicles in one city or district constitute a regular and 
established place of business. It is also unclear whether a com-
pany has a regular and established place of business when hun-
dreds of drivers use a company’s name to make money from that 
use, but the company does not actually own anything in the dis-
trict.165 The cars are physical locations, but Uber probably does 
not meet the Cray test based on the cars. Unless Uber purchases 
the cars for the drivers, they likely have not “established” the 
 
trolls, as defendants using the Uber Model are often software and app-based 
businesses. 
 160. For example, Uber is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in 
San Francisco. See Uber Techs., Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities 
(Form D) (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1543151/ 
000154315114000001/xslFormDX01/primary_doc.xml; Company Info, UBER, 
https://www.uber.com/newsroom/company-info (last visited Nov. 17, 2018). 
 161. See Pepe & Brenner, supra note 40, at 703. 
 162. See Artyom Dogtiev, Uber Revenue and Usage Statistics 2017, BUS. 
APPS (July 23, 2018), http://www.businessofapps.com/data/uber-statistics 
(Uber provides over 200,000 trips per day in New York City). 
 163. Tom Goodwin, The Battle Is for the Customer Interface, TECHCRUNCH 
(Mar. 3, 2015), https://beta.techcrunch.com/2015/03/03/in-the-age-of 
-disintermediation-the-battle-is-all-for-the-customer-interface. 
 164. Uber’s revenue in 2016 topped $6.5 billion. Reuters, Here’s How Much 
Uber Made in Revenue in 2016, FORTUNE (Apr. 14, 2017), http://fortune.com/ 
2017/04/14/uber-revenue-2016. 
 165. The commentators are unsure whether this is sufficient to make venue 
appropriate. See Pepe & Brenner, supra note 40, at 704. This is another argu-
ment in favor of Congress legislating on the point. Section 1400(b)e provides no 
guidance in such a situation. 
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cars in the district sufficiently.166 Section 1400(b) does not, in-
deed cannot, provide sufficiently clear guidance on the issue. 
These issues are not addressed in prior case law, and could not 
have been contemplated when § 1400(b) was enacted. As a re-
sult, judicial attempts to answer these questions are unlikely to 
produce a workable balance. 
Because of modern, technologically-influenced business 
practices that may be completely different from business prac-
tices envisaged by Congress when § 1400(b) was enacted, appli-
cation of § 1400(b) today raises substantially more questions 
than answers, and the answers that have been supplied are in-
consistent at best. 
C. INCONSISTENCIES PRODUCED BY APPLYING CRAY IN THE 
MODERN WORLD 
There have been nearly sixty motions to transfer venue in 
infringement actions decided under Cray;167 in only seven cases 
has venue been found proper under the Cray test.168 In those 
cases, there have been wide variations in what constituted the 
defendant’s place of business. Some decisions have been clear: In 
one case, FedEx operated several stores in the district, which 
clearly constituted a regular and established place of business;169 
 
 166. See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also supra 
Part I.C.2. It is questionable whether the cars would also be considered “places 
of business.” See supra Part I.C.2. 
 167. Case count provided by author as of September 13, 2018. 
 168. See, e.g., Seven Networks, LLC v. Google, LLC, 315 F. Supp. 3d 933, 
966–67 (E.D. Tex. 2018); RegenLab USA LLC v. Estar Techs. Ltd., No. 16-cv-
08771, 2018 WL 3910823, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2018) (granted with respect 
to one defendant; denied with respect to a second); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. 
of Tex. v. Medtronic PLC, No. A-17-CV-0942-LY, 2018 WL 2353788, at *2–3 
(W.D. Tex. May 17, 2018), vacated in part on reconsideration by No. A-17-CV-
0942-LY, 2018 WL 4179080 (W.D. Tex. July 19, 2018); GEODynamics, Inc. v. 
DynaEnergetics US, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00371-RSP, 2017 WL 6452803, at *1 (E.D. 
Tex. Dec. 18, 2017); Plexxikon Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., No. 17-cv-04405-
HSG, 2017 WL 6389674, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2017); Intellectual Ventures II 
LLC v. FedEx Corp., No. 2:16-CV-00980-JRG, 2017 WL 5630023, at *6–7 (E.D. 
Tex. Nov. 22, 2017); Am. GNC Corp. v. ZTE Corp., No. 4:17CV620, 2017 WL 
5157700, at *1–2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2017), mandamus granted, order vacated 
sub nom. In re ZTE (USA) Inc., 890 F.3d 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 169. Intellectual Ventures, 2017 WL 5630023, at *6. 
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in another case, the defendant operated a call center in the dis-
trict;170 in a third case, the defendant had a manufacturing facil-
ity and a research facility in the district;171 in a fourth case, the 
defendant had established a research facility in the district with 
its name on the building, representing that the facility was its 
place of business.172 However, under Cray, not all cases have 
been so straightforward. In one case, testimony that the defend-
ant would be relocating a distribution facility into the district, 
given at trial in a separate infringement action, was sufficient to 
establish a regular and established place of business in the dis-
trict.173 In another case, the court held that server space leased 
in the district was sufficient to provide venue.174 
The recent case law on what is not a “regular and estab-
lished place of business” has also been unclear. Data stored on 
leased servers in the district for the purpose of improving service 
to customers in the district may or may not be sufficient.175 Sell-
ing thousands of products in the district and having employees 
regularly service those products in the district is also insuffi-
cient.176 
These cases demonstrate the inconsistency produced by the 
Federal Circuit’s requirement of a “physical place, of business, of 
the defendant,”177 and how the Federal Circuit’s attempt to sim-
plify the venue analysis has been unsuccessful. Where (appar-
ently unsubstantiated) trial testimony that a place of business 
 
 170. Am. GNC, 2017 WL 5157700, at *1. The accuracy of the information 
provided at trial has now been called into question based on information not in 
the district court’s opinion. See ZTE, 890 F.3d at 1010, 1015–16. 
 171. Plexxikon, 2017 WL 6389674, at *2. 
 172. Bd. of Regents, 2018 WL 2353788, at *3. 
 173. GEODynamics, 2017 WL 6452803, at *1. The opinion does not state 
whether the facility was actually established. Compare id., with In re Cray Inc., 
871 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (requiring that the place of business “for a 
meaningful time period be stable, established”). While unstated, the court may 
have relied upon an estoppel theory to hold the plaintiffs to representations they 
had made in the other case. For a discussion of estoppel applied to determining 
patent venue, see infra Part III.A.3. 
 174. Seven Networks, LLC v. Google LLC, 315 F. Supp. 3d 933, 949, 965–66 
(E.D. Tex. 2018). 
 175. Compare id. at 965 (finding a “place of business” in leased server rooms 
while acknowledging that such spaces “may not, on their own, establish proper 
venue”), with Pers. Audio, LLC v. Google, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 922, 933–35 
(E.D. Tex. 2017) (holding that leased servers did not constitute a regular and 
established “place of business”). 
 176. Lites Out, LLC v. OutdoorLink, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-00192, 2017 WL 
5068348, at *2–4 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2017). 
 177. Cray, 871 F.3d at 1364. 
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will be established suffices for venue, and having employees ser-
vice thousands of products in the district does not suffice, there 
is absolutely no predictability for litigants on either side. 
The Federal Circuit admitted that the venue analysis is not 
amenable to “precise rule[s]” and that “each case depends on its 
own facts.”178 Despite that statement, the Federal Circuit at-
tempted to lay down a bright-line rule: Cray effectively de-
manded a brick and mortar store or office in the district.179 The 
Federal Circuit’s desire to avoid a rigid rule gave way in the face 
of statutory text that demanded one. The Federal Circuit’s ad-
monishment of the Raytheon four-factor test for being “not suffi-
ciently tethered to the statutory language”180 is correct. Section 
1400(b) contains no language which would support the Raytheon 
factors. The plain text of the statute does not permit such con-
siderations,181 and where the text is clear, it is controlling.182 Re-
gardless of its forum-shopping faults, VE Holding provided pre-
dictability for litigants: venue was broad and coextensive with 
personal jurisdiction. In an attempt to reduce the breadth of 
venue under VE Holding, the Supreme Court and the Federal 
Circuit, in TC Heartland and Cray, destroyed that predictability 
and replaced it with uncertainty and inconsistency. The scales 
have tipped too far in an attempt to compensate—a balance must 
be struck. Some uncertainty must be accepted in order to balance 
the interests at stake. To provide plaintiffs meaningful forum 
choice in infringement actions and limit the burden of litigating 
in inconvenient forums, some uncertainty must be accepted. 
Therefore, to alter the statutory analysis in a manner that can 
effectively consider modern technology and business practices, 
while cabining the uncertainty, a new statute is needed. 
 
 178. Id. at 1362. 
 179. See id. at 1364. 
 180. Id. at 1362. 
 181. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). Neither the “residence” prong nor the 
“regular and established place of business” prong contain language any regard-
ing Raytheon’s factors. See also supra Part I.C.2. 
 182. See United States v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929) (“[W]here 
the language of an enactment is clear . . . the words employed are to be taken 
as the final expression of the meaning intended.”). 
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D. THE RECENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO AMEND §1400(B) 
There has only been one recent proposal for amending 
§ 1400(b),183 introduced by Senator Jeff Flake of Arizona.184 
However, it died in committee.185 Senator Flake’s proposal 
(S. 2733) made several changes to the present version of 
§ 1400(b), but included tests similar to both the “residence” and 
“regular and established place of business” prongs of the current 
§ 1400(b), with minor modifications.186 
The “residence” prong is amended to read “where the de-
fendant has its principal place of business or is incorporated.”187 
S. 2733’s modification of the “regular and established place of 
business” prong clarifies that the defendant must have a “regu-
lar and established physical facility that gives rise to the act of 
infringement.”188 
S. 2733 provides several more methods of obtaining venue 
in infringement actions.189 The first of these is any district in 
which the defendant has consented to suit.190 The second is in a 
district where the invention embodied in the patent was devel-
oped.191 The third is where either party in the suit has a “regular 
and established physical facility” where it did developed the in-
vention at issue, manufactured a product embodying the inven-
tion at issue, or uses a patented manufacturing process that is 
at issue in the suit.192 S. 2733 also includes a provision which 
 
 183. Technically, there have been two, but the second proposal is omnibus 
patent reform and incorporates the first proposal with only minor changes. For 
the purposes of this Note, they are effectively identical and will be treated as 
such. Compare Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, 
S. 2733, 114th Cong. (2016), https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/s2733/BILLS 
-114s2733is.pdf, with H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 281B (2015). 
 184. S. 2733. As Senator Flake is retiring when his term ends in 2019, it is 
unclear whether S. 2733 (or a new version of it) will be reintroduced. See Alex 
Isenstadt & Kevin Robillard, Flake Announces Retirement as He Denounces 
Trump, POLITICO (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/24/ 
flake-retiring-after-2018-244114. 
 185. See S. 2733 - Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 
2016, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/ 
2733 (last visited Nov. 17, 2018) (indicating that the bill was referred to com-
mittee on March 17, 2016 and noting no further actions). 
 186. See S. 2733 § 2(b)(1), (2). 
 187. Id. § 2(b)(1). 
 188. Id. § 2(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 189. Id. § 2(b)(3)–(6). 
 190. Id. § 2(b)(3). 
 191. Id. § 2(b)(4). 
 192. Id. § 2(b)(5). 
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provides that for foreign defendants not falling under any provi-
sion in S. 2733, § 1391(c) controls.193 Finally, S. 2733 provides 
that, under no circumstances, can the homes of employees or 
contractors working from home be used to support venue in their 
home districts.194 
S. 2733 indicates that at least some members of Congress 
recognize that the current patent venue regime is not function-
ing properly, but it does not provide a complete remedy.195 
E. WHY S. 2733 IS INADEQUATE  
While S. 2733 is a good first step in updating § 1400(b), it 
does not effectively address several issues inherent in patent 
venue analysis in the twenty-first century. In some cases, 
S. 2733 even represents a step backward from the current venue 
regime of TC Heartland and Cray. 
1. S. 2733’s Positive Aspects 
S. 2733 provides several strong, concrete methods of obtain-
ing venue in any given patent infringement action, which repre-
sents an improvement over the current patent venue regime. 
These avenues also represent the judgment of at least one mem-
ber of Congress as to appropriate considerations in the patent 
venue analysis. 
The “residence” prong amendments, while not changing the 
analysis substantially,196 have a beneficial clarifying effect on 
the analysis. The statute clearly states that an appropriate fo-
rum for litigating is the defendant’s state of incorporation,197 not 
its “residence;”198 “incorporation” is a term that requires no in-
terpretation, unlike “residence.” Further, there is already a Su-
preme Court test interpreting language identical to the “princi-
pal place of business” language in the corporate diversity 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).199 This provision also represents 
 
 193. Id. § 2(b)(6); see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) (2012). 
 194. S. 2733 § 2(c). 
 195. Senator Flake introduced S. 2733 prior to TC Heartland. See CON-
GRESS.GOV, supra note 185. It is possible that if Senator Flake had introduced 
S. 2733 after TC Heartland and Cray, S. 2733 may have been different. 
 196. Presumably, any “principal” place of business would also constitute a 
“regular and established” place of business. 
 197. S. 2733 § 2(b)(1). 
 198. Id. § 2(c). 
 199. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). This is the “nerve center” test from Hertz Corp. 
v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010). 
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a compromise between solely the state of incorporation permit-
ted under TC Heartland by “residence”200 and the VE Holding 
personal jurisdiction standard.201 
The explicit codification of consent in S. 2733 is also an im-
provement.202 In a sense, consent is not a new method of obtain-
ing venue; even if venue is improper, if the defendant does not 
raise the defense, it has consented to suit in that district.203 Ex-
plicitly codifying consent as a way to make venue proper, how-
ever, ensures that parties have notice that they can expressly 
consent to be sued in a particular district, which may reduce lit-
igation costs. 
The provision for venue in a district in which “an inventor 
named on the patent in suit conducted research or development 
that led to the application for the patent in suit” is a change for 
the better as well.”204 To take the Uber example again, assume 
that the patent infringed in Chicago was developed in Chicago; 
the inventor of the patent would be able to sue Uber for its in-
fringement of the patent in Illinois federal court. Presumably, 
the forum in which a patentee developed an invention is also a 
convenient forum for that patentee to litigate an infringement 
action. 
S. 2733 also provides for venue where either party in the suit 
has a “regular and established physical facility” where it did sub-
stantial research and development for an invention claimed in 
the patent in suit, manufactured a product that embodies the 
invention at issue, or uses a patented manufacturing process 
that is at issue in the suit.205 This provision would establish 
venue in a district in which any party in the action has a physical 
facility in which either the invention or an infringing version 
thereof was developed, manufactured, or used. To use the Uber 
hypothetical once again, venue would be appropriate in the state 
where the infringed patent was developed, as well as the state 
in which Uber developed the infringing version. It would not be 
 
 200. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 201. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 202. S. 2733 § 2(b)(3). 
 203. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1) (stating that a failure to raise a defense of 
improper venue under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3) results in a waiver of that de-
fense). 
 204. S. 2733 § 2(b)(4). 
 205. Id. § 2(b)(5). 
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proper, under that provision, in a district in which Uber merely 
infringes the patent.206 
Finally, S. 2733 includes a catchall provision for foreign de-
fendants, ensuring that the courts have guidance for determin-
ing venue in cases where American inventors sue foreign infring-
ers. This provision, permitting venue under § 1391(c)(3) permits 
venue “in any judicial district.”207 This is sensible, as a foreign 
defendant likely does not particularly care whether it is sued in 
New York or Delaware, a foreign forum is still a foreign forum. 
2. S. 2733’s Shortcomings 
While several of S.2733’s provisions are a positive step for-
ward from the current venue regime, the same cannot be said for 
all of its changes. S. 2733’s modification to the “regular and es-
tablished physical facility” prong restricts venue to physical 
places of business giving rise to the infringement.208 While this 
language does simplify the venue analysis by making the re-
quirements clearer, this would narrow the range of possible ven-
ues even from the current restrictive Cray standard, as the facil-
ity must not only be physical, but also give rise to the act of 
infringement. Thus, under Cray, a store which does not sell in-
fringing products could give rise to venue, but under S. 2733, it 
would not. S. 2733 would also exclude stores which sell products 
made by an infringing manufacturing process, as the store itself, 
the physical place of business, does not give rise to the infringe-
ment. While it may be appropriate to tie a defendant’s suscepti-
bility to suit in a particular district to its infringing actions spe-
cifically, rather than its presence in the district generally,209 if 
the defendant is present in the district, venue should not be de-
nied based on technicalities. Indeed, if S. 2733’s “regular and es-
tablished physical facility” language was the only method of ob-
taining venue, under S. 2733, a defendant might not even be 
susceptible to suit in its state of incorporation, a concept soundly 
rejected by over a century of venue jurisprudence.210 
 
 206. Although venue might be proper in that instance under another provi-
sion, the categories are not mutually exclusive. 
 207. S. 2733 § 2(b)(6); see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) (2012). 
 208. S. 2733 § 2(b)(2). 
 209. See infra Part III.A.1; see also supra Part I.C.1. 
 210. See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 
1514, 1518–19 (2017) (chronicling past judicial interpretations of § 1400(b)). 
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While S. 2733’s provision for venue in districts where the 
defendant developed the infringing version is a good step for-
ward,211 the next two provisions regarding where the defendant 
manufactures a tangible product embodying the invention or im-
plements a patented process212 suffer from serious defects. These 
provisions are clearly aimed at creating venue where acts of in-
fringement occur. However, these provisions ignore the exist-
ence of software patents or other patents that do not have phys-
ical embodiments, unless the infringing version was developed 
in the district. Under this language, if Uber developed an in-
fringing version of a software patent in Canada and distributed 
it electronically, venue could not be properly obtained anywhere. 
Finally, S. 2733 provides that under no circumstances shall 
“[t]he dwelling or residence of an employee or contractor of a de-
fendant who works at such dwelling or residence . . . constitute 
a regular and established” place of business sufficient to meet 
the requirements for venue.213 This would categorically prohibit 
venue from being established by sales representatives or tele-
commuters in the district, even if those sales representatives or 
telecommuters are, by their actions, directly or contributorily in-
fringing or inducing infringement. In the Uber Model, this would 
likely prevent venue from being proper based on drivers in the 
district. It is a logical step from excluding sales representatives 
or telecommuters from venue analysis to excluding Uber drivers. 
This exemption could easily further limit Cray, an already nar-
row conception of venue. Cray was careful to note that if a sales 
representative or other employee of the defendant (like a tele-
commuter or Uber driver) maintained a “physical place, of busi-
ness, of the defendant” in the district, venue was proper.214 Per 
S. 2733, under no circumstances would this be permitted.215 The 
statute would also exclude a store which sells products manufac-
tured using an infringing process, but not stores which sell items 
which infringe simply by existing, a thin difference. In order to 
rectify these potential escape routes for defendants in infringe-
ment actions, Congress should amend § 1400(b) to include both 
concrete methods of obtaining venue, as well as a totality of the 
circumstances test that explicitly allows courts to consider fac-
tors not included in S. 2733. 
 
 211. S. 2733 § 2(b)(5)(A). 
 212. Id. § 2(b)(5)(B), (C). 
 213. Id. § 2(c). 
 214. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 215. S. 2733 § 2(b). 
  
1554 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1523 
 
III.  HOW § 1400(B) CAN BE MODIFIED TO PROVIDE FOR 
PROPER VENUE IN A MODERN WORLD   
Other than its recodification as § 1400(b) in 1948,216 the pa-
tent venue statute has barely changed since its enactment in 
1897.217 In contrast, the world has changed dramatically. When 
§ 1400(b) was originally enacted in 1897, airplanes did not yet 
exist. A statute written in 1897 will have difficulty being applied 
to a technological field of law over a century later. Patent venue 
is a statutory creation and, as far as statutes go, § 1400(b) does 
not say much. Because Cray is correct in its restrictive interpre-
tation,218 the only way to make § 1400(b) broader (and flexible 
enough to apply to twenty-first century technology) is for Con-
gress to amend it. To properly address current complex venue 
considerations, a more adaptable statute is needed: a multifac-
tor, totality of the circumstances approach. Raytheon was a step 
in the right direction, but the totality of the circumstances ap-
proach used was unsupported by § 1400(b)’s text.219 An amended 
statute should explicitly include factors that, in light of the to-
tality of the circumstances, make venue appropriate in any par-
ticular district, as well as providing several concrete avenues to 
make venue appropriate and to simplify the analysis where pos-
sible.220 
Section A lays out the factors a statute must consider in 
remedying S. 2733’s defects. Section B proposes a Model Patent 
Venue Statute (MPVS) to incorporate these factors, and demon-
strates how the MPVS creates a workable balance between the 
current regime of TC Heartland and Cray, and VE Holding’s 
past failure. 
 
 216. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 87, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 936. 
 217. Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695, with 28 
U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). 
 218. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 219. See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (criticizing 
Raytheon for departing from the text of § 1400(b)). 
 220. Of course, any multi-factor “standard” is subject to potential abuse by 
judges or litigants, see Rogers, supra note 10, but strict appellate review, which 
the Federal Circuit has demonstrated it is capable of providing, see Cray, 871 
F.3d 1355, can minimize the issue. This Note’s proposed statute is modeled in 
part on the codification of the fair use defense in copyright law. See 17 
U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (providing a list of four factors to be considered in determin-
ing whether a defense of fair use in a copyright infringement action succeeds). 
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A. FACTORS A MODERN PATENT VENUE STATUTE SHOULD 
CONSIDER  
In today’s digitally connected world, Cray’s brick-and-mor-
tar requirement for a “regular and established place of busi-
ness”221 cannot capture the necessary nuance to provide fair 
venue options. Consider the Uber Model, discussed above.222 As-
sume Uber infringes a patent in Chicago (to its substantial ben-
efit). Assume also that the owner of that patent is also located in 
Chicago, and that the patent was developed in Chicago. Finally, 
assume that Uber is incorporated in Delaware and only meets 
the Cray test in California, where it is headquartered. Section 
1400(b), per Cray, mandates that that patent owner litigate in 
either California or Delaware, which is of questionable fairness 
to the patentee.223 Or, consider Amazon. Amazon provides cloud 
webservices for companies from physical server locations in var-
ious districts across the country, primarily Washington state.224 
Cray says that no company alleging that infringement is per-
formed by (or on) those servers can sue the defendant in Wash-
ington—any physical place of business based on those web serv-
ers is not established by the defendant: it’s established by 
Amazon. In order to prevent such unfairness, several considera-
tions should be taken into account in the venue determination. 
1. The Benefit the Defendant Receives from Infringement 
Within the District 
The Raytheon court considered one of its four factors to be 
the benefit the defendant receives from its presence in the dis-
trict.225 However, a more proper consideration is the benefit the 
defendant receives from acts of infringement in the district. Un-
der the “regular and established place of business” prong, the 
defendant is not subject to suit in a district because it is incorpo-
rated there; it is being sued for its acts of infringement in that 
district. This approach is embodied in the current § 1400(b) 
 
 221. See Cray, 871 F.3d at 1360 (“[T]here must be a physical place in the 
district.”). 
 222. See supra Part II.B. 
 223. Under S. 2733, this would not occur as the development provision would 
permit suit in Illinois. However, S. 2733 was introduced before both TC Heart-
land and Cray and was clearly intended to restrict venue from the VE Holding 
permissiveness. How Senator Flake (and the rest of Congress) feel about the 
current venue regime is unclear. 
 224. See Pepe & Brenner, supra note 40, at 705. 
 225. Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 3d 781, 798 (E.D. Tex. 2017); 
see supra Part I.C.1.  
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which requires acts of infringement for venue to be proper, not 
simply the defendant’s presence in the district.226 Under Ama-
zon’s business model, assume that Amazon operates several web 
services for a corporation in Washington, one of which is alleg-
edly infringing. That corporation’s susceptibility to suit would be 
judged based on the benefits the corporation receives from the 
infringing web services performed in the district, not the non-
infringing services. This factor ties the defendant’s amenability 
to suit in a particular district directly to its acts of infringement 
and benefits derived from that infringement. The more benefits 
derived from infringement in the district, the more weight venue 
in that forum is given. 
2. The Presence of the Defendant’s Employees and 
Contractors in the District 
The presence or absence of employees and contractors in a 
district is an essential consideration in patent venue in today’s 
modern business world. This approach is already tacitly sup-
ported by both the current § 1400(b) and S. 2733.227 To again 
consider the Uber Model,228 assume that all of Uber’s actual em-
ployees reside and work in California, but that Uber has several 
thousand drivers in Chicago who are, with Uber, engaged in in-
fringing a patent in Chicago. If the infringement is occurring in 
Chicago, that infringing activity, and employees performing it, 
would be a consideration in the venue analysis. Even if the cur-
rent and proposed venue schemes had not endorsed this consid-
eration, principles of personal jurisdiction also support it. Patent 
infringement is a tort;229 where an intentional tort is committed 
and expressly aimed at the forum, a court in that state has per-
sonal jurisdiction over the tortfeasor.230 Further, where a de-
fendant has continuously and deliberately exploited a market in 
 
 226. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012) (venue is proper in districts where the 
defendant “has committed acts of infringement” and has a “regular and estab-
lished place of business”); see also S. 2733, 114th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2016) (requir-
ing the regular and established facility to give rise to the acts of infringement). 
 227. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b); S. 2733 § 2(b)(1)–(2). If a defendant has a reg-
ular and established place of business or principal place of business in a district, 
it presumably hires or employs persons within that district. 
 228. See supra Part II.B. 
 229. N. Am. Philips Corp. v. Am. Vending Sales, Inc., 35 F.3d 1576, 1579 
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that while patent infringement is a cause of 
action created by statute, it is a “tort”). 
 230. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984). 
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a state, “it must reasonably anticipate being haled into court” to 
answer for its actions in that forum.231 
Here, Uber is intentionally infringing the patent and dis-
tributing its infringing version to its contractors in the forum. 
Uber has the intent that its drivers use the infringing version in 
the forum, and thus that the injury be felt in the forum. Uber 
would then be subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois, so 
venue arguably should be proper as well.232 In fact, Chicago, be-
ing the third largest city in the United States,233 is a city in 
which Uber might reasonably expect to be sued for infringing a 
patent relating to its drivers. Or, imagine a company which has 
many employees who telecommute to work every day, but in the 
performance of their duties, these telecommuting workers in-
fringe a patent in their home district, an infringement which the 
company benefits from. Such employees engaged in infringing 
activities would be a consideration in the propriety of venue in a 
given district. Contrast this with Amazon’s web services: the 
company hiring Amazon to perform computing functions would 
have no employees in the district where the computing occurs, 
which would cut against venue being proper. Thus, this provi-
sion would not always work to expand venue in cases where tech-
nology-based business practices are at issue. 
3. Defendant’s Representations that It Is Present in the 
District 
The Federal Circuit has approved the consideration of the 
defendant’s representations of its presence in the district under 
the current § 1400(b).234 If the defendant makes out that it has 
a place of business, or that it is present in the district beyond 
merely “doing business” there,235 that representation would be a 
consideration as to the fairness of permitting venue in a partic-
ular infringement action. In cases where a party is willfully led 
to believe certain facts by another party, relies on those facts, 
 
 231. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984). 
 232. This would not limit the defendant from moving to transfer the case. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404. 
 233. The 50 Largest Cities in the United States, POLITIFACT, https://www 
.politifact.com/largestcities (last visited Nov. 17, 2018). 
 234. See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The district 
court is correct that a defendant’s representations that it has a place of business 
in the district are relevant to the inquiry.”). 
 235. This is the lower standard required to establish venue generally. Cray, 
871 F.3d at 1361; see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). 
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and injures himself as a result of those believed facts, the assert-
ing party may not then turn around and claim that those facts 
are untrue.236 In essence, the defendant would be estopped from 
claiming that it did not have a “regular and established place of 
business” in the district. Potentially relevant considerations un-
der this prong would include “whether the defendant lists the 
alleged place of business on a website, or in a telephone or other 
directory; or places its name on a sign associated with or on the 
building itself.”237 
4. Defendant’s Targeted Interactions with the District in 
Relation to the Infringing Activity 
Another factor to consider is the extent to which the defend-
ant targets the district with the infringing activity. As noted, the 
defendant’s acts of infringement in a district are considered rel-
evant to the venue analysis.238 Analogizing personal jurisdiction 
again, a defendant’s ongoing business or contractual relation-
ships in the district (for example, engaging in patent infringe-
ment) can subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction, even in 
the absence of physical contacts.239 Personal jurisdiction and 
venue require different analysis, and venue is generally more 
difficult to obtain than personal jurisdiction,240 but a company 
like Uber has physical contacts in the district: its drivers, who 
are “a permanent and continuous presence” in the district.241 
Suppose Uber advertises a new service in Chicago which in-
fringes a patent. The advertisement of the infringing activity, 
even if no one uses it, would weigh in favor of subjecting Uber to 
suit in that district.242 If a defendant provides customer service 
or technical support for infringing products or activity, or has 
ongoing contractual relationships selling infringing products 
into a particular district, that, too, would weigh in favor of venue 
 
 236. See MLB v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1076 (Fla. 2001) (describing the 
law of equitable estoppel). 
 237. Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363–64. 
 238. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). 
 239. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) 
(“[W]e have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts 
can defeat personal jurisdiction.”). 
 240. Logantree LP v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., No. SA-17-CA-0098-FB, 2017 WL 
2842870, at *1 (W.D. Tex. June 22, 2017). 
 241. In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 242. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever without authority . . . offers 
to sell . . . any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”). 
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being proper in that district.243 As noted above, the district 
where the infringement occurs is where the harm occurs.244 
Thus, it is appropriate for a dispute over the infringement to be 
litigated in the district where the harm occurs. 
5. The Defendant’s Relative Contacts Relating to 
Infringement in the District Compared to Other Districts 
This factor looks at the amount of the defendant’s contacts 
in the district that relate to infringing activity in comparison to 
the same infringing activity in other districts.245 In districts 
where a business entity is committing greater infringing activ-
ity, it is more proper to subject the defendant to suit in that dis-
trict.246 This approach is already contemplated in § 1400(b): “acts 
of infringement,” not a single act, are required to make venue 
permissible.247 Clearly, the framers of § 1400(b) intended that 
more than simply a minor, passing act of infringement in the 
district could give rise to venue. Taking the Uber Model again, 
assume that Uber has ten times as many infringing rides in New 
York City as it does in Connecticut. It would be more appropriate 
to subject Uber to suit in New York than in Connecticut. Ama-
zon’s web services are also instructive in this context. Patents on 
a process, of which software patents are a variation, are in-
fringed only when one entity performs all of the steps in the pro-
cess.248 Amazon would perform all the steps by providing the web 
services, which would subject the company hiring Amazon to li-
ability249—the question would then be where venue is appropri-
ate. If the company has hired Amazon servers in both Washing-
ton and Texas, but five times as many servers in Washington, 
Washington would be a more proper forum.250 
 
 243. See id. (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, . . . or sells any pa-
tented invention . . . infringes the patent.”). 
 244. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 245. Limited discovery may be available for purposes of jurisdiction and 
venue analysis. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 n.13 
(1978). 
 246. This is not to say that the defendant would be immune from suit in the 
district in which it engages in fewer acts of infringement, only that the fact that 
there are districts where more or less infringing activity is present is a consid-
eration in the venue analysis. 
 247. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). 
 248. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. 797 F.3d 1020, 1022 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
 249. Liability for infringement lies at the feet of the party directing the in-
fringing activity. See id. 
 250. This assumes that venue could be obtained based on such web services 
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6. The Location and Length of Time Where the Infringed 
Patent Is Practiced 
This factor gives more weight to a plaintiff ’s forum choice if 
they are actually practicing (not simply holding) the patent in a 
particular district. This is intended to limit the ability of trolls 
to harass defendants with suits in inconvenient or overly plain-
tiff-friendly jurisdictions.251 The court would consider the length 
of time the patent had been practiced in the district at issue in 
an effort to prevent trolls from practicing briefly in a plaintiff-
friendly district and then filing suit. In analyzing this factor, a 
court would look for evidence that the patent is being practiced 
in the district in which the suit is filed, and if it is, that would 
weigh in favor of venue in that district. In a sense, this factor is 
similar to S. 2733’s provision of venue in a district where the 
patentee developed the invention.252 The location where the pa-
tent is practiced is presumably a district which the patentee has 
contacts with and is a convenient litigating forum, similar to the 
district in which the patentee developed the invention. For in-
stance, if the inventor of the patent infringed by Uber as de-
scribed above is operating a competing product or service in Chi-
cago, that would weigh in favor of venue in Illinois. 
However, the considerations outlined above are intended to 
be neither exhaustive nor all required. A particularly strong 
showing in one consideration should be able to balance a weaker 
or nonexistent showing in one or more of the others. In this way, 
the venue analysis would be like copyright’s fair use defense. 
Fair use provides four factors for a court to consider in determin-
ing infringement.253 None of the four factors alone is required, 
nor is any one alone dispositive. They form a holistic approach 
to as whether, as a matter of fairness, the particular use of the 
copyrighted material is actually infringement or not.254 The con-
siderations are rooted in fairness, and the court should take into 
 
being provided. Under this Note’s proposed statute, see infra Part III.B, venue 
might be obtained. Under § 1400(b), venue would be improper. 
 251. See supra Part II.A. 
 252. Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S. 2733, 
114th Cong. § 2(b)(5)(A) (2016). 
 253. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (listing four factors for the court to use to 
determine infringement: (1) purpose and character of use; (2) nature of copy-
righted work; (3) amount of copyrighted work used; and (4) effect on the market 
for the copyrighted work). 
 254. See generally JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFOR-
MATION ECONOMY 563–650 (4th ed., 2015) (discussing the fair use doctrine gen-
erally). 
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account the equities of the particular case in determining 
whether venue is appropriate.255 
B. A PROPOSED MODEL PATENT VENUE STATUTE TO STRIKE THE 
BALANCE BETWEEN CRAY AND VE HOLDING  
S. 2733 includes several excellent improvements and clarifi-
cations on the current incarnation of § 1400(b) but leaves several 
potential gaps for defendants to avoid suit. In short, it does not 
swing the pendulum back far enough—it is still too restrictive. 
To remedy this and strike the proper balance between providing 
defendants predictability in where they may be sued and giving 
plaintiffs meaningful choice of forum, the following amendment 
to § 1400 is proposed, adopting many of S. 2733’s proposed 
changes, rejecting a few (principally, the categorical exclusion of 
telecommuters), while also incorporating a multifactor equity 
test:256 
(b) In actions for patent infringement brought under 35 
U.S.C. § 271, a civil action for patent infringement or an ac-
tion for declaratory judgment of invalidity or noninfringe-
ment of a patent may be brought only in a judicial district— 
(1) where the defendant has its principal place of busi-
ness or is incorporated; or 
(2)  where the defendant has committed an act or acts of 
infringement of a patent in suit and has a regular and 
established presence that gives rise to the act or acts of 
infringement; or 
(3) where the defendant has agreed or consented to be 
sued in the instant action; or 
(4) where an inventor named on the patent in suit con-
ducted research or development that led to the applica-
tion for the patent in suit or where the defendant con-
ducted research or development on an allegedly or 
potentially infringing version of the patent in suit; or 
(5) in the case of a foreign defendant that does not meet 
the requirements of paragraph (1) or (2), in accordance 
with section 1391(c)(3); or 
(6) where the district court determines that, as a matter 
 
 255. The proposed MPVS in Part III.B makes this clear. 
 256. The current text of § 1400(b) would be stricken and replaced wholesale. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). Similar language could be used for determining 
venue in copyright infringement actions, currently codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1400(a). 
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of equity, the defendant should reasonably anticipate be-
ing haled into court for infringement of the patent in 
suit;257 in determining whether the defendant is subject 
to suit in a particular district, the court shall consider— 
(A) the benefit the alleged infringer receives from acts 
constituting infringement within the district; 
(B) the presence of employees or contractors in the dis-
trict who engage in acts of infringement or assist the 
alleged infringer in acts of infringement; 
(C) the defendant’s representations that it is present in 
the district; 
(D) the defendant’s targeted interactions in the district 
regarding the infringing activity; 
(E) the defendant’s relative contacts relating to the acts 
of infringement in the district compared to such con-
tacts in other districts; 
(F) the plaintiff ’s practice of the infringed patent in the 
district in which the suit is filed; 
The fact that any factor is missing shall not itself bar a find-
ing that venue is proper if such finding is based upon considera-
tions of the other above factors. 
 
*** 
The Model Patent Venue Statute (MPVS) borrows the best 
aspects of S. 2733, namely clarifying § 1400(b)’s language, codi-
fying consent, and permitting venue where the invention was de-
veloped, while closing S. 2733’s loopholes, and adding a multi-
factor equity test based on factors tied to the defendant’s acts of 
infringement and the plaintiff ’s work on or with the invention in 
the district.258 As paragraphs (1), (3), and (5) are taken verbatim 
from S. 2733, the rationale for their selection requires no further 
explanation.259 The remaining factors will each be further dis-
cussed and explained. 
 
 257. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) 
(discussing situations in which defendants should reasonably expect to be haled 
into court in a given jurisdiction). 
 258. See supra Part III.A. 
 259. See supra Part II.D. 
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1. Regular and Established Presence 
Paragraph (2) of the MPVS represents a compromise be-
tween the current Cray standard permitting any regular and es-
tablished physical place of business260 to give rise to venue and 
S. 2733’s requirement that the place of business give rise to the 
infringement. Paragraph (2) requires that the Defendant’s pres-
ence give rise to the infringement, but not that the presence be 
a physical establishment. This ensures that a defendant is sub-
ject to suit in a district due to its acts of infringement, not merely 
its presence in the district unrelated to those acts. This require-
ment is also provided for in maintaining § 1400(b)’s requirement 
for acts of infringement to occur in the district. It is intended to 
provide venue for defendants like Uber and companies hiring 
Amazon’s computing services. For instance, Paragraph (2) can 
provide venue in a district where Uber is infringing because the 
acts of infringement occur in the district and Uber has a regular 
and established presence in the district: the cars. While the same 
drivers are not always driving for Uber in a given place at a given 
time, there is no doubting that Uber has a regular and estab-
lished presence in any major American city, and the cars are 
where the business is transacted. Certainly, under Cray, Uber’s 
cars would not be a defendant’s place of business, but unless 
Uber removes itself from the district entirely, it will have a per-
manent and continuous presence in the district. A requirement 
that the place of business be physical ignores the ability of com-
panies to contract out computing services to corporations like 
Amazon. The company using Amazon’s servers is transacting 
business in the district where the servers are located, but the 
company itself has no physical place of business in the district, 
only Amazon does. Thus, to avoid the loophole, there should not 
be a requirement that the facility be physical. Further, the re-
quirement that the defendant have only a “presence,” as opposed 
to a “place of business” may subject the company hiring Amazon 
to venue. 
2. Development or Production of a Patented Invention 
Under S. 2733 § 2(b)(5), there is no provision for venue in a 
district where the defendant is practicing a nonphysical patent, 
other than where the infringing version was developed. This is a 
glaring oversight. Many patents today are nonphysical, such as 
 
 260. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see supra Part 
I.C.2. 
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software processes or business methods. To provide any sort of 
balance, such patents must be considered in determining venue. 
S. 2733 makes the judgment that the production of a physical, 
patented article, or the use of a physical manufacturing process, 
is sufficient to give rise to venue in a district, but makes no pro-
vision for venue when the infringement involves the creation of 
software or use of nonphysical patented processes. It is nonsen-
sical for the one to be covered, but not the other; a patent is a 
patent. A software patent is neither less nor more deserving of 
the same protections as a patent on a physical invention. The 
MPVS does away with this distinction for the practice of infring-
ing articles and folds venue analysis for such acts under the mul-
tifactor approach.261 The MPVS, however, retains S. 2733’s pro-
vision for venue in a district in which either the patented 
invention or the infringing version was developed. Here, if Uber 
were to develop an infringing version of a software patent in New 
Jersey where the original invention was developed in Pennsyl-
vania, venue would be proper in either forum. 
3. Omission of Limitation on Telepresence and Employee 
Homes 
A categorical ban on using the presence of telecommuters 
and sales representatives to establish venue runs counter to over 
a century of patent venue jurisprudence. Courts have long rec-
ognized that, under § 1400(b), the presence of a defendant’s em-
ployees in the district at issue can make venue appropriate in 
that forum.262 Under the venue analysis, the infringing acts of 
employees in the district at issue are relevant to the venue de-
termination. Imagine a business with corporate headquarters in 
New York. Engineers at this company telecommute to the head-
quarters from their homes in Connecticut and use their homes 
as the company’s manufacturing space using technology such as 
3D printers provided by the company;263 the company has no ac-
tual manufacturing space other than its employees’ homes. 
S. 2733 would categorically ban these residences from being 
used to create venue in Connecticut, even though the engineers 
are performing activities that would give rise to venue under 
 
 261. See supra Part III.B. 
 262. See, e.g., In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 735–37 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (sales 
representatives in the district were sufficient to provide venue). But see Univ. 
of Ill. Found. v. Channel Master Corp., 382 F.2d 514, 516 (7th Cir. 1967) (finding 
a single sales representative in the district insufficient for proper venue). 
 263. This could arguably satisfy the Cray standard for venue. Cray, 871 F.3d 
at 1360. 
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S. 2733 § 2(b)(5). The MPVS accepts no such limitations and 
would fold such employees engaging in acts of infringement into 
the venue analysis under (b)(6)(B). 
4. Considerations of Equity 
No statute ever written can possibly comprehend every sit-
uation that might come before a judge. Bright-line rules, like 
Cray or S. 2733, provide a sort of objectivity at the cost of injus-
tice in specific instances.264 Bright line rules, do, however, pro-
vide simplicity in application. For example, under TC Heartland, 
the defendant’s residence is its state of incorporation—nowhere 
else.265 Therefore, to provide for administrative simplicity where 
possible, the MPVS provides concrete avenues for venue: state of 
incorporation or principal place of business, where the defendant 
consents to be sued, and where the invention or infringing ver-
sion was developed. However, to ensure that plaintiffs are not 
unfairly prevented from litigating in proper forums, and stripped 
of their traditional right to choose the forum,266 the MPVS pro-
vides more flexible options. The heart and soul of these flexible 
options is the multifactor equity test. The multifactor approach 
incorporates the considerations described above267 into an anal-
ysis similar to fair use in copyright:268 each factor is weighed in-
dividually, and the court determines whether, in the instant 
case, it is fair for the defendant to be subject to suit in the par-
ticular district. 
The MPVS will likely be critiqued for an increase in forum-
shopping by patent plaintiffs and subject defendants to a higher 
degree of uncertainty regarding where they may be sued by pa-
tent plaintiffs. The MPVS may be criticized for its potential for 
judges to abuse the multifactor equity test to maintain patent 
cases in their jurisdictions.269 There may also be concerns that 
 
 264. See United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1335 (7th Cir. 1990) (Pos-
ner, J., dissenting) (discussing the pros and cons of bright line rules). 
 265. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 
1517 (2017). 
 266. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (“[A] plaintiff ’s 
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed . . . [unless] the chosen forum would 
[be inconvenient to the defendant] out of all proportion to plaintiff ’s conven-
ience.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 267. See supra Part III.A. 
 268. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (providing a list of factors to consider in de-
termining whether a defense of fair use in a copyright infringement action suc-
ceeds). 
 269. Cf. Rogers, supra note 10 (suggesting that some patent judges may have 
an economic incentive to keep patent cases in their dockets). 
  
1566 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1523 
 
the adoption of the language of “reasonably anticipate being 
haled into court,” the personal jurisdiction standard,270 may sig-
nal a return to the days of VE Holding. These concerns, however, 
are misplaced. 
Historically, choice of forum is reserved for the plaintiff,271 
and the MPVS is in keeping with that jurisprudence. Concerns 
of excessive forum-shopping are balanced by the benefits of giv-
ing plaintiffs meaningful choice of forum in patent suits and by 
limiting their ability to be dragged from their own home forums 
to validate their patent rights against infringers. While some 
judges may be susceptible to economic pressure to maintain 
cases within their dockets, the Federal Circuit has demonstrated 
that it is willing to reverse such cases that are clearly erroneous 
and an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.272 Finally, the lan-
guage regarding a defendant’s reasonable anticipation of suit in 
a particular district is qualified by reference to the specific pa-
tent in suit; it is less broad than the normal personal jurisdiction 
standard. If the infringing version is not being employed in a 
particular district, the defendant cannot reasonably anticipate 
being sued in that district. Even if the text were facially as broad 
as the personal jurisdiction standard, courts will give effect to all 
provisions of a statute where possible.273 Thus, if the equity test 
were as broad as personal jurisdiction, the other provisions 
would have no effect. 
The MPVS also recognizes that forum-shopping can be par-
ticularly problematic in the patent context,274 and seeks to limit 
that forum shopping to areas where a defendant might “reason-
ably anticipate being haled into court.”275 Neither plaintiffs nor 
defendants want to be forced to litigate in inconvenient forums, 
but the MPVS strikes the balance in favor of the plaintiff who is 
attempting to vindicate his patent rights over a corporation that 
is potentially infringing them. Ultimately, balancing concerns of 
 
 270. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
 271. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 241 (“[A] plaintiff ’s choice of forum should rarely 
be disturbed.”). 
 272. See, e.g., In re ZTE (USA) Inc., 890 F.3d 1008, 1015–16 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(remanding to the district court for consideration of factors that had previously 
been ignored); In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (remand-
ing for further analysis of the parties’ arguments). 
 273. This is the rule against surplusage. See Chickasaw Nation v. United 
States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (noting that effect is given to each word, if possi-
ble, unless those words are inconsistent with the rest of the statute). 
 274. See supra Part II.A. 
 275. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
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public policy, such as the interests of litigants in infringement 
actions is for Congress, not the courts.276 
While this statute will substantially broaden venue options 
for plaintiffs from TC Heartland and Cray, and likely encourage 
some degree of forum-shopping in patent suits, as well as lead to 
an increase in unpredictability for defendants, it is intended to 
be substantially narrower than the VE Holding personal juris-
diction standard.277 The MPVS is designed to strike a balance 
between the highly restrictive TC Heartland/Cray regime and 
the extraordinarily permissive VE Holding, while also attempt-
ing to reduce litigation over venue where possible. Some degree 
of forum-shopping and uncertainty in litigation is required to 
give meaningful forum choice to plaintiffs in infringement ac-
tions, and the MPVS attempts to chart a middle course between 
the two recent polar opposites seen in infringement jurispru-
dence. 
  CONCLUSION   
Even where statutes have remained effectively unchanged 
for over a century, litigants still frequently dispute how they ap-
ply; § 1400(b) is one such statute. The judiciary has attempted 
to refine the approach to patent venue analysis; however, as de-
scribed above, their efforts have been unsuccessful in modifying 
the patent venue scheme to a modern, interconnected world.278 
A statue written in the nineteenth century is difficult to apply 
when technology has engendered a radical paradigm shift in the 
business practices the statute was intended to apply to. While 
the actions of the courts have been successful in reducing forum-
shopping,279 the courts are unable to balance the scales of justice, 
having overcorrected in their attempts. The MPVS attempts to 
resolve the current problems with venue in patent actions by in-
corporating both concrete avenues for creating venue, as well as 
an equity-based multifactor approach.280 This statute is in-
tended to permit most venue decisions to be in keeping with the 
need for administrative simplicity in application, as well as to 
 
 276. See Harris v. Harris, 424 F.2d 806, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“The public 
policy on any matter is primarily for the lawmakers.”). 
 277. See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 
1584 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (describing the personal jurisdiction standard). 
 278. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 279. See Howard, supra note 12 (noting evidence that indicates a decrease 
in the number of patent infringement cases in the Eastern District of Texas and 
an increase in motions to transfer). 
 280. See supra Part III.B. 
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provide an avenue for creating venue which takes into account 
the interests of the parties in the action. This Note provides a 
suggestion for how to strike that balance by combining concrete 
avenues for venue to provide administrative simplicity and a to-
tality of the circumstances equity test to ensure fairness in 
venue selection in infringement actions. 
